



D6.3: Policy Recommendations based on Delphi exercise

WP6 - Strategies for reconnection: party democracy

Federico Russo¹ and Elif Şeyma Şişman¹

¹University of Salento

January 2026

How to cite this document: Russo, F. & Şişman, E. Ş. (2025). Policy Recommendations based on Delphi exercise. REDIRECT deliverable D6.3. HORIZON-CL2-DEMOCRACY-01-Democracy in flux. Grant Number: 101095142.

Funding: REDIRECT is a project funded by the EU's Horizon-Europe programme. Call: HORIZON-CL2-DEMOCRACY-01-Democracy in flux. Grant Number: 101095142. More information can be found at <https://redirect.unisi.it/>.

Contents

1	Introduction	3
2	Empowering citizens	5
2.1.	Civic Education Initiatives	5
2.1.1.	Diffusion	7
2.1.2.	Policy Recommendations	9
2.2.	Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations (PMOs)	10
2.2.1.	Diffusion	11
2.2.2.	Policy Recommendations	13
3	Revitalizing Political Parties	15
3.1.	New Forms of Party Membership	15
3.1.1.	Diffusion	16
3.1.2.	Policy Recommendations	18
4	Making Parliaments More Representative and Trustworthy	20
4.1.	Regulating Lobbying	20
4.1.1.	Diffusion	21
4.1.2.	Policy Recommendations	23
4.2.	Strengthening Parliamentary Transparency and Communication	24
4.2.1.	Diffusion	25
4.2.2.	Policy Recommendations	26
	Conclusion	27
	Acknowledgements	28
	References	28

1 Introduction

This deliverable is the final product of Work Package 6 (WP6), titled “Strategies for reconnection: party democracy.” The Work Package aimed to provide an overview and evaluation of the reconnection strategies implemented in recent years to improve the functioning of the fundamental pillars of traditional party democracy. In line with the objectives of the REDIRECT project and the scope of the original call, the ultimate goal of this WP is to produce a list of actionable, evidence-based policy recommendations. To situate this report within the broader context of the WP, we briefly recall the content and key results of preceding deliverables, which form the necessary foundation for the present document.

Table 1: List of reconnection strategies and actions

Strategy	Typical action
Empowering citizens	1a) Voting advice application 1b) Parliamentary monitoring websites 1c) Civic education initiatives 1d) Lowering the voting age to 16 years 1e) E-petitions
Revitalizing political parties	2a) Reform of the candidate selection procedures 2b) Reform of the leadership selection procedures 2c) Online participation platforms 2d) Online crowdfunding 2e) Microtargeting 2f) New forms of party membership
Making parliaments more representative and trustworthy	3a) Gender quotas 3b) Youth quotas 3c) Regulating lobbying 3d) Strengthening parliamentary transparency and communication 3e) Strengthening parliamentary consultation and participation tools

Deliverable 6.1 introduced the concept of ‘reconnection strategies’ designed to revitalize the links between citizens, political parties, and parliaments. These strategies address three primary areas of concern for contemporary democracies:

- 1) Empowering citizens to enhance their engagement with governing elites;
- 2) Revitalizing political parties;
- 3) Fostering more representative and trustworthy parliaments.

For each strategy, D6.1 identified a range of concrete actions applied across various European

social and political contexts. This list has since been updated in cooperation with all REDIRECT project teams; the final version comprises 16 actions, as detailed in Table 1.

Deliverable 6.2 reported the results of three real-time Delphi studies, one for each strategy, in which a total of 50 experts were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of various actions. In addition to this task, experts were invited to rate the severity and significance of several remote causes and empirical manifestations of the representative disconnect affecting European democracies (see Deliverables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 for a conceptual discussion of “disconnect”). The goal of the Delphi studies was to encourage experts to reflect on different actions and determine whether a consensus on their effectiveness could be established. Following the methodological criteria adopted for those studies, a positive consensus was defined as 70% or more expert agreement on an action’s effectiveness. The experts reached a consensus on three actions: two related to empowering citizens and one regarding making parliaments more representative and trustworthy. Two additional actions received moderate support; however, it was decided to develop policy recommendations for these as well.

There is a broad expert consensus regarding the high efficacy of Civic Education Initiatives and Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations (PMOs). Experts emphasize that democratic values are best cultivated through a “whole-school” educational strategy, particularly when academic learning is integrated with practical experiences such as youth councils and community service. This approach establishes a continuous “civic pathway” that supports individuals from adolescence into adulthood by providing stable opportunities for engagement in both physical and digital environments. Furthermore, PMOs are recognized for their ability to generate data that demystifies institutional operations. The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in this context not only clarifies the policymaking process but also strengthens parliamentary accountability and broadens citizen involvement.

Regarding parliaments, experts strongly advocate for the regulation of lobbying to enhance institutional transparency. By clarifying how special interest groups influence policy, these regulations help the public understand the consequences of political apathy and hold representatives accountable. Additionally, a significant majority (65%) of experts identified the modernization of parliamentary communication as a vital tool for reconnection. Improving the accessibility and quality of information provided through official digital platforms is seen as a primary driver for restoring public trust and fostering democratic participation.

In contrast, the panel failed to reach a consensus on strategies for revitalizing political parties, a topic characterized by significant internal polarization. Most proposed measures were viewed as neutral—neither clearly effective nor ineffective—by a plurality of experts. One notable exception was the concept of “new forms of party membership,” which received support from a narrow 57% majority. While this figure did not meet the formal criteria for consensus, the recommendation was included in the final policy set, albeit with a particular emphasis on the potential risks associated with improper implementation.

Table 2: List of reconnection actions for which we elaborated policy recommendations

Strategy	Typical action
Empowering citizens	Parliamentary monitoring websites Civic education initiatives
Revitalizing political parties	New forms of party membership
Making parliaments more representative and trustworthy	Regulating lobbying Strengthening parliamentary transparency and communication

For each of the identified actions (see Table 2), this document provides a concise description, an analysis of its diffusion, and specific policy recommendations. These recommendations were developed through an exchange of ideas among the WP6 partners regarding the Delphi results, as well as through interviews with experts from both within and outside the REDIRECT project's Scientific Advisory Board. These experts were selected based on their specific expertise and were interviewed regarding a single action. Each expert was provided with the Delphi results (Deliverable 6.2) and asked three questions:

- Do you think the following action is effective for its stated aim?
- In your experience, what are the most critical 'do's' and 'don'ts' that should be considered when implementing such an action?
- Please provide one or two clear examples of good practice. Also please mention any ineffective approaches you have observed.

It is important to note that in drafting these policy recommendations, we emphasized both the potential and the risks associated with each action. Our aim was to move beyond a standard list of best practices and provide a nuanced, critical document that can serve as the basis for ongoing scholarly discussion. Where a tension existed between complexity and parsimony, we privileged the former, leaving the task of prioritizing actionability to the policy briefs that will be produced at the conclusion of the REDIRECT project.

2. Empowering citizens

2.1. Civic Education Initiatives

A significant body of research indicates that citizens are growing increasingly disenchanted with the traditional actors and institutions of representative government. In most established democracies, trust in political parties, parliaments, and the government has declined over the past few decades, with only a minority of European citizens expressing confidence in them. Furthermore, levels of conventional political participation are generally decreasing, though important variations exist across countries (Norris, 2011; Wattenberg, 2020).

Another concern is youth political participation, specifically, as much of the decline in turnout

is concentrated among young people (Blais, 2007), who currently participate in institutional politics less than other age cohorts (Deželan, 2023). This disconnect represents a serious threat as the health of democracies depends on active citizen participation (Donbavand & Hoskins, 2021).

One strategy to address this problem is the improvement of civic education initiatives, which provide citizens with the necessary tools for active political involvement. It is evident that the decline in political participation—particularly given that youth turnout in several European countries is currently at a historic low—does not stem from a lack of information. Instead, the primary factors underlying this phenomenon are likely a lack of trust in political institutions and a growing perception that politics is unresponsive to citizens' needs.

However, the relationship between responsiveness and political participation is likely bidirectional. Research has established that voter turnout has a positive effect on both agenda and policy responsiveness (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010) and that this responsiveness is unequal, as politicians pay more attention to the most active citizens. For instance, in the US, districts with lower turnout have a lower impact on their representatives' policy positions (Martin & Clai-bourn, 2013). Additionally, research indicates that the perception that lower social classes are underrepresented partly explains why the less well-off have lower turnout levels (Peters & En-sink, 2015). If the relationship between responsiveness and political participation is indeed reciprocal, it is reasonable to expect that low participation could trigger a negative spiral: fuelling low responsiveness, which in turn further discourages political engagement.

Civic education can be instrumental in increasing the political interest and sense of efficacy among younger generations, (Ancheta-Arrabal & Preckler Galguera, 2025; UNESCO, 2016; UNU-WIDER, 2014) thereby enhancing their political participation and breaking the negative spiral between low responsiveness and low participation. This provides a solid empirical foundation for the hypothesis that civic education may contribute to reversing the downward trend in youth voter turnout across the European Union.

Civic education can be broadly defined as the range of activities designed to provide young citizens with learning experiences that empower them to play an active role in society and politics at local, national, and supranational levels. This has the potential to encourage young people to participate more actively in political life. Drawing from Dewey's (2010) view, democracy functions as a mode of co-existence through collective experience; the sustainability of this co-existence hinges upon an educated citizenry. Furthermore, such education is essential for mitigating social inequalities in political participation. Given that more privileged individuals tend to be more politically active while disadvantaged groups often remain less engaged, there is a clear imperative to cultivate active political engagement among all young people, irrespective of their social background (Donbavand & Hoskins, 2021). In this sense, civic education has the potential to empower young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to exercise a greater political voice within the system. (Hoskins et al., 2017).

Effective education is key to democracy, as it is the means by which citizens become informed and gain the capacity to critically filter the knowledge they access. Without a foundational level

of civic knowledge, it is difficult for individuals to integrate new information into a coherent framework (Galston, 2001). The role of education in promoting democracy is closely intertwined with developing the capacity to act for social justice and to participate fully in civic and social life (Ancheta-Arrabal & Preckler Galguera, 2025). In this sense, civic education initiatives are powerful tools for empowering citizens and fostering active, inclusive participation in socio-political life.

2.1.1. Diffusion

In Europe, civic education is typically implemented as a cross-curricular theme, integrated into other disciplines, or taught as a standalone subject in primary and secondary schools. While its presence has grown over the last 50 years, the turn of the 21st century saw an accelerated effort to address emerging challenges, such as declining social capital, waning political participation, reduced trust in democratic institutions, and a lack of tolerance for diversity. Although formal curriculum activities remain the most widespread approach, alternative and innovative methods also exist¹. These include extracurricular activities such as simulations, role-plays, radio and television programs, and ICT-based educational tools. Notable European examples include the European Parliament's "Virtual Role Play Game"², a 60-minute online simulation that enables students to engage with decision-making processes directly from the classroom. Additionally, Model United Nations³ engages hundreds of thousands of students annually. These simulations provide practical insights into institutional functions, potentially encouraging active participation in real-world politics.

In the European Union, the concept and the scope of civic education have broadened, encompassing not only political knowledge but also the development of values, attitudes, and skills needed for active and responsible participation in society. This broader approach is often referred to as citizenship education. This trend gained momentum in 2015, when EU education ministers adopted the Paris Declaration on promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance, and non-discrimination through education. Civic (and citizenship) education has a long tradition in the United States and several other non-European countries. For instance, in Australia, the "Discovering Democracy" curriculum was implemented in 1998 as a non-compulsory initiative (Manning & Edwards, 2013).

To date, almost all European countries have implemented some form of civic or citizenship education in schools, though wide variation exists regarding teacher specialization and whether the subject is compulsory. According to the 2017 Eurydice report (European Commission, 2017), citizenship education is integrated into EU school systems as a compulsory standalone subject, as part of another subject, or as a cross-curricular theme. France, Francophone Belgium, Austria, Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Greece emphasize it through dedicated, compulsory courses. In contrast, Italy⁴, Flanders (Dutch-speaking Belgium)⁵ and Norway⁶ adopt a transversal ap-

¹https://www.civicus.org/documents/toolkits/PGX_B.Civic%20Education.pdf

²<https://visiting.europarl.europa.eu/en/digital-journey/the-virtual-role-play-game>

³<https://www.un.org/en/mun>

⁴<https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2019;92>

⁵<https://codex.vlaanderen.be/PrintDocument.ashx?id=1005384&datum=&geannoteerd=true&print=false>

⁶<https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/eurypedia/norway/teaching-and-learning-single-structure-education?>

proach, whereby multiple subjects contribute to achieving civic education objectives. Meanwhile, Hungary⁷, Germany⁸ and various school systems in the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales & Northern-Ireland)^{9 10} follow a mixed strategy, combining specific civic education courses with transversal objectives integrated across the curriculum.

In all European countries, the national or regional authorities responsible for education develop broad civic education objectives for school systems, providers, or local schools; the latter are granted autonomy regarding implementation, methods, and resources¹¹. Most European countries introduce civic education at the secondary school level (notably Italy, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, and Germany); however, France and Norway more ambitiously incorporate foundational social and civic knowledge into their primary school curricula.

The number of hours devoted to civic education also varies considerably across European countries. In Flanders, Norway, and England¹², for instance, there are no statutory requirements specifying the number of hours to be allocated to civic education. Most other European countries, however, include one to two mandatory hours per week in their curricula¹³. Finally, regarding teacher training of civic education, the situation also differs widely across Europe. In Italy, for example, 30 hours of in-service training are required, supplemented by an additional 10 hours for each course¹⁴. Germany, Hungary, France, and the UK also provide in-service training in addition to initial teacher education. In contrast, Poland and Norway primarily include civic education within initial teacher training only. In Belgium, neither the Dutch- nor the French-speaking systems offer specific teacher training dedicated to civic education. On the Francophone side, however, catalogues of training methods are available, and teachers without a teaching degree must obtain a mandatory certificate to teach civic education in primary schools.

Some approaches to civic education can be regarded as interesting examples. The Austrian experience demonstrates that lowering the voting age to 16 (Karlhofer, 2007) is most effective when structurally coupled with mandatory civic education (Meyvaert, 2024). Following the 2007 reform, 16-to-17-year-olds exhibited turnout rates comparable to the general population and significantly higher than the 18-to-21-year-old cohort (Schwarzer et al., 2009; Zeglovits & Aichholzer, 2014). This “first-time voter” success is attributed to the school-based delivery of civic tools; conversely, those who had exited formal education before the reform showed a lower voting propensity (Kritzinger et al., 2013). Crucially, this integrated approach mitigated the “social gap” by fostering internal political efficacy and interest among students from lower so-

utm_source=chatgpt.com

⁷<https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/eurypedia/hungary/teaching-and-learning-general-secondary-education>

⁸https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747459/EPRS_BRI%282023%29747459_EN.pdf

⁹<https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/citizenship-national-curriculum/>

¹⁰<https://www.sqa.org.uk/sqa/47448.html>

¹¹For example, Flanders: https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/efd4d7/161656_2020_09_01.pdf#:~:text=In%202018%20hebben%20de%20Vlaamse%20regering%20en,burgerschapseducatie.%20Dit%20artikel%20is%20een%20politiek%20filosofische or France: https://eduscol.education.fr/619/l-organisation-des-enseignements-au-college?utm_source=chatgpt.com

¹²In England, the allocated time is set locally: <https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/citizenship-national-curriculum/>

¹³For example, French-speaking Belgium: <https://deuxheurescestmieux.be/faq/>

¹⁴<https://www.citized.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/T1.2.Law-92.2019-ITALY-IIHL.pdf>

cioeconomic backgrounds, creating a persistent “socialization effect” that continued to narrow participation disparities as these cohorts matured into adulthood (Kritzing et al., 2013; Zeglövits & Zandonella, 2013).

In Scotland, the promotion of social equality in youth political engagement is notably more successful than in the rest of the United Kingdom, as evidenced by the absence of significant class-based inequalities in political interest among students (Huebner & Eichhorn, 2022). Research suggests this outcome is fundamentally linked to Scotland’s specialized approach to civic education, specifically through the ‘Modern Studies’ course. Unlike the transversal or cross-curricular models prevalent in England, this dedicated subject provides a structured space for political learning that appears to insulate participation rates from socioeconomic disparities (Jerome, 2012). The curriculum is sustained by a strong emphasis on the principles and procedures of the democratic process, as well as the distribution of power within the UK and the international arena. Furthermore, teachers receive specialized training to facilitate debates on controversial issues and to manage contested viewpoints among students.

2.1.2. Policy Recommendations

According to the results of our Delphi study and the REDIRECT research project, civic education initiatives are essential for democratic health. Theoretically, civic education serves as a catalyst to disrupt the negative spiral between youth disengagement and low political responsiveness. Its primary function is to enhance young citizens’ confidence to participate actively in democratic politics while developing the skills necessary to hold political authorities accountable. The efficacy of these initiatives depends on transitioning from a ‘knowledge-transmission’ model toward an ‘accountability-empowerment’ model. Ultimately, civic education should be implemented through a holistic model that integrates theoretical and practical knowledge, anchored by robust discourse on democracy and liberal values to ensure these principles are deeply internalized rather than merely understood superficially.

To interrupt the negative spiral between low participation and low responsiveness, we propose the following structural framework:

I. Strategic Institutionalization and Mandatory Delivery

Civic education must be a mandatory, standalone subject in secondary education (as seen in Austria). By establishing it as a core requirement, we ensure that disadvantaged youth—who are often excluded from informal political socialization—are equipped with the ‘tools of efficacy’ necessary to demand responsiveness from their representatives.

II. The Three Pillars: Knowledge, Capacity and Practical Experimentation

Following expert consensus, the curriculum must move beyond ‘how a bill becomes a law’ (Knowledge) and ‘deliberative skills’ (Capacity) to include Institutional Monitoring. Students should learn to track parliamentary activity and government policymaking, evaluating whether policy outputs align with their priorities. Complementing class-based courses, schools should provide participatory and deliberative initiatives, which are proven to directly enhance the propensity of young people to commit to political initiatives.

III. Teacher Empowerment and Training

Educators are the frontline of this intervention. We recommend a robust institutional framework within higher education to provide specialized training. Crucially, teachers must be granted dedicated 'pedagogical space' to discuss contemporary, contested issues without fear of partisan labeling. This can be achieved through targeted professional development aimed at facilitating debates on controversial issues, enabling teachers to manage diverging opinions without compromising political neutrality.

IV. Context adaptation

The implementation of a standardized framework for civic education remains largely ineffective without context-specific adaptation. Consequently, institutions should encourage teams to design activities and projects that are responsive to local challenges and socio-political orientations. For instance, research findings on citizenship and human rights education in secondary schools within the Wallonia–Brussels Federation (conducted in 2016–2017, commissioned by the Observatory for Childhood, Youth and Youth Welfare)¹⁵ were translated into a methodological toolkit. This toolkit was designed to assist educational teams in tailoring actions to local requirements.

V. Introducing an EU-level Benchmarking Model

To ensure the effectiveness of civic education implementation, the European Commission could support the creation of a monitoring and peer-learning framework for Member States. Under this framework, Member States would be able to assess the impact of their civic education policies and learn from reciprocal successes and challenges. This approach aligns with the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which is already applied in policy areas where the EU holds supporting or coordinating competence.

VI. Addressing disinformation in civic education

It is critical that students are equipped with the pedagogical tools necessary to navigate an increasingly complex information landscape. Addressing the challenge of disinformation requires the deployment of robust mechanisms designed to prevent cognitive and informational manipulation. In this context, providing teachers with instructional resources and methodological frameworks is essential to effectively counteract the spread of disinformation and foster digital resilience among students

2.2. Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations (PMOs)

In recent decades, the relationship between parliaments and the public has become a primary concern for both policymakers and academics, as it is often viewed as the most visible manifestation of political disaffection (Leston-Bandeira, 2012). This issue reflects a public perception of parliaments as increasingly detached from the citizenry. While parliaments have not necessarily become less trustworthy than in the past, the rise of a more informed and 'critical citizenry'

¹⁵<https://oejaj.cfwb.be/catalogue/oejajdetails/fiche/synthese-de-recherche-pour-les-equipes-educatives-portant-sur>

(Norris, 2011) and the decline of party identification (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002) have elevated the standards by which politicians are evaluated.

Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations (PMOs) are civil society organizations that aim to promote public awareness of parliamentary processes, enhancing both accountability and citizen engagement. They strengthen the components of democratic governance, including the accountability of parliaments to the public, citizen participation in the legislative process, and access to information regarding parliamentary work (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016). In this regard, PMOs significantly reduce informational barriers to participation by translating complex legislative activities into accessible public knowledge. Edwards et al. (2015), argue that PMOs function as social projects situated within a broader information ecology, designed to innovate democratic systems by enabling human and technological synergy.

The core problem PMOs address is the 'moral hazard' inherent in the delegation of power, which stems from the imperfect link between voters and their representatives (Worthy & Langehennig, 2022). While Members of Parliament are formally agents of the voters, they benefit from a significant information asymmetry that allows for potential 'misbehavior.' In this context, PMOs empower citizens by providing data on parliamentarians and their activities. Specifically, agents may shirk their responsibilities due to divergent policy preferences, a preference for inactivity, or the use of public office for private gain. By tracking MPs' campaign pledges, asset declarations, voting behavior, and the work of collective bodies (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016), PMOs do more than merely highlight wrongdoing; they also encourage self-correction, contributing to 'democratic control by anticipated reaction' (Worthy & Langehennig, 2022).

The primary democratic functions of PMOs are to hold representatives accountable for their deliberations and conduct, while mobilizing public pressure for increased transparency and integrity (Edwards et al., 2015). PMOs pursue their goals primarily through Parliamentary Monitoring Websites (PMWs), as these platforms offer cost-efficient ways to gather, analyze, and present information to the public. However, PMOs remain fundamental to citizen empowerment only if their objective extends beyond the mere publication of data to the capacity-building required to transform that information into meaningful projects with real-world impacts.

One risk of PMWs is that by focusing on quantitative indicators—such as the number of questions, attendance, or 'reliability' scores—they may incentivize MPs to optimize their behavior for these metrics while neglecting the substantive, 'invisible' work of legislation that escapes a PMO's scraper. This creates the risk of a 'performance fallacy', where PMOs inadvertently encourage 'theater' over substance, thereby increasing the gap between symbolic and substantive responsiveness.

2.2.1. Diffusion

A study Mandelbaum and Swislow (2016), identified more than 220 parliamentary monitoring organizations (PMOs) monitoring over 90 national parliaments worldwide. These organizations are dedicated to enhancing various aspects of democratic governance, such as bolstering parliamentary accountability, promoting citizen involvement in the legislative process, and im-

proving access to information pertaining to parliamentary activities

Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations have implemented Parliamentary Monitoring Websites (PMWs) as tools for oversight within diverse democratic frameworks. In the UK, the most prominent example is TheyWorkForYou, a website run by mySociety that provides access to MPs' voting records and other legislative data. It is distinguished by practical design features such as searchable MP profiles, voting histories, and email alerts, as well as plain-language bill explanations, clear data source documentation, and a long-term sustainability model. Its effectiveness is further driven by two key factors: its strong integration with civil society advocacy and journalism, and its ability to transform complex legislative data into a functional accountability tool for the public.

In Germany, Abgeordnetenwatch.de (Parliament Watch) serves as a prominent platform facilitating dialogue between citizens and their representatives. The website receives approximately 350,000 unique visits per month; notably, 80 percent of the more than 100,000 questions posed to parliamentarians through the platform have received a response (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016).

In Italy, Openparlamento¹⁶ provides comprehensive data on bills, dossiers, legislative timelines, roll-call votes, and MP profiles, alongside indicators such as voting cohesion and reliability. The platform allows users to track specific representatives, bills, and topics while offering transparent methodologies for its indicators. A key innovation of its 2024 redesign is the extended monitoring scope, which now analyzes executive acts such as decree-laws and implementing decrees. This enables the PMO to adapt to political shifts and track de facto power, ensuring that monitoring remains substantive rather than merely symbolic. Furthermore, the platform links to analyses that interpret raw data, while the integration of hyperlinks to Openparlamento pages bridges the gap between institutional transparency and user comprehension. Finally, the redesign addressed previous inefficiencies by removing unnecessary functions, such as mandatory user registration for specific acts. This approach has reduced technical overhead while enhancing long-term sustainability.

Other notable PMOs include Regard Citoyens¹⁷ & Datan¹⁸ in France, as well as the ePaństwo Foundation¹⁹ & Stowarzyszenie 61 (Association 61)²⁰ in Poland. These organizations provide citizens with more than raw parliamentary data on MPs' profiles and voting behavior; they offer longitudinal analyses of bill evolution and data-driven insights.

In the UK, the Westminster Accounts²¹ by Tortoise Media features a searchable database of political finance. By utilizing nested circle charts, it transforms complex financial information into a comprehensible format, enabling voters to better understand the earnings and external interests of MPs.

¹⁶https://fondazione.openpolis.it/en/faq?utm_source=chatgpt.com

¹⁷<https://www.regardscitoyens.org/nosdeputes-fr/> & <https://blog.lafabriquedelaloi.fr/fr>

¹⁸<https://datan.fr/>

¹⁹https://data.europa.eu/sites/default/files/use-cases/poland.-_epanstwo.foundation.pdf

²⁰<https://www.developmentaid.org/organizations/view/170143/stowarzyszenie-61>

²¹<https://www.tortoisemedia.com/data/the-westminster-accounts>

Outside the European context, OpenStates (by Plural) in the United States serves as a prime example of a PMO acting as data infrastructure. By providing a robust API and standardized legislative data, it facilitates extensive secondary use and analysis by researchers and NGOs.

2.2.2. Policy Recommendations

Our results suggest that Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations (PMOs) can be effective tools for empowering citizens, bolstering their political efficacy, and fostering active participation in the policymaking process. In this section, we highlight critical success factors and identify significant procedural pitfalls to avoid when implementing PMOs. In general terms, PMO design involves the entities subjected to monitoring, the data concerning these entities, and the methodologies employed to evaluate that information (Edwards et al., 2015). The overall objective of introducing PMOs is not only to reinforce the relationship between citizens and parliaments but also to strengthen the policy process by institutionalizing democratic checks and balances (Mandelbaum & Swislow, 2016). Therefore, the pursuit of transparency should be conducted in tandem with strengthening the monitoring function.

The capacity of PMOs to consolidate democracy and empower citizens depends on specific conditions being met, from the pre-design phase through to implementation. To achieve sustained public impact and institutional transparency, a holistic framework must be applied across the entire project lifecycle. Simultaneously, PMOs should minimize the 'performance fallacy' trap. In conclusion, PMOs should be viewed as components of a broader ecosystem in which the relationship between citizens and parliaments is strengthened, with technology serving as a catalyst for democratic practices. Practically, the design and implementation of PMOs necessitate an integrated approach aimed at providing clear, trustworthy information while enhancing transparency—ultimately empowering citizens to monitor parliamentary activities and hold representatives accountable.

In this respect, we recommend the following framework:

I. Conducting Preliminary Studies

We recommend conducting preliminary research to ensure the context-specific effectiveness of PMOs. Given that every parliament is unique, PMO models must be tailored to their specific environments. Therefore, the design process should be preceded by a preliminary study that analyzes available data in light of parliamentary procedures. This phase serves to identify what information can be realistically extracted and which datasets are most relevant to the public interest.

II. Prioritizing Usability and Accessible Language

During the operational phase, platforms must ensure high levels of usability and functionality by prioritizing user-centered design. The interface should focus on translating complex technical data into tangible, actionable insights. Crucially, all technical procedures and parliamentary terms must be communicated in clear, accessible language to ensure broad public comprehension.

We argue that data publication does not inherently guarantee empowerment. Without expert interpretation, raw data may inadvertently widen the participation gap and lead to unintended consequences, such as political alienation among citizens who lack the necessary cognitive or interpretive tools to navigate the information.

III. Optimizing Operational Effectiveness through Technical Standards

To maximize platform impact, several core technical requirements must be addressed. Specifically, PMOs should provide clear executive summaries, intuitive interfaces, robust search functionality, automated alerts, and data visualization tools. Furthermore, adherence to accessibility standards, mobile responsiveness, and multilingual support is essential for broadening civic participation. Finally, conducting regular usability testing is vital to ensuring the platform remains functional and responsive to user needs.

IV. Strategic Design Considerations

It is essential to address several design considerations to ensure these platforms do not produce unintended consequences. Specifically, PMOs must avoid presenting data through simplistic scores or league tables when the underlying methodological assumptions are opaque. Such practices can undermine institutional trust and distort legislative behaviour. Furthermore, design elements, including algorithmic logic and categorization schemes, must be carefully governed, as they directly dictate which information citizens perceive as most significant.

Additionally, PMOs should facilitate civic integration by providing open APIs, bulk downloads, permissive licenses, and stable identifiers. These functionalities allow journalists, researchers, NGOs, and civic technologists to build derivative tools, conduct independent analyses, and integrate monitoring data into broader advocacy workflows.

V. Developing Meaningful Indicators

The content of these platforms must remain consistent with the specific political context and the aforementioned objectives. It is imperative that the data provided be both trustworthy and interpretable. To maximize effectiveness, PMOs should develop meaningful indicators such as agenda attention, responsiveness to public issues, coalition dynamics, amendment behaviour, and longitudinal policy stability.

These indicators clarify the complexities of political representation, equipping citizens with the necessary tools to monitor parliamentary activities and hold representatives accountable. Furthermore, supplementing data with an editorial section is highly beneficial; such data-driven storytelling acts as a vital bridge between institutional complexity and the public interest.

VI. Governance and Sustainability

Institutional autonomy from political actors is paramount to ensuring the credibility of PMOs. For this reason, clear governance structures, funding transparency, and strict editorial independence are essential to maintaining long-term legitimacy and operational resilience.

VII. PMOs as Learning Systems

PMOs should be conceptualized as broader learning systems by incorporating user feedback, usability testing, and stakeholder partnerships to identify which types of information most effectively drive political engagement. This iterative approach mitigates the risk of PMOs providing data that lacks practical utility. Furthermore, such mechanisms ensure that the platform remains culturally and institutionally compatible with its specific political context.

VIII. Creating International Networks

Beyond the technical and substantive aspects of monitoring websites, Parliamentary Monitoring Networks serve as powerful tools for enhancing global transparency initiatives. These networks increase the legitimacy and visibility of national PMOs while providing a collaborative space for sharing best practices. Such coalitions have the potential to empower organizations to act collectively as guardians of democratic principles. By launching collaborative initiatives, these networks help PMOs increase citizen engagement on platforms designed for open governance.

3. Revitalizing Political Parties

3.1. New Forms of Party Membership

The crisis facing contemporary democracy is intrinsically linked to the inability of political parties to connect citizens with the state. As mediators, their detachment from the electorate has resulted in a failure to translate social demands into effective policymaking (Wolkenstein, 2019).

Political parties remain integral to the functioning of state institutions; indeed, modern democracies are often characterized as 'party democracies,' as elected representatives frequently adhere to party directives (Budge, 2020). The most direct evidence cited to argue that parties are weakening is the decline in party membership, a trend supported by incontrovertible data (Poguntke et al., 2016).

There are also growing concerns regarding the decline of traditional parties and the increasing fragmentation of party systems (Mair, 2013; Poguntke et al., 2024). This decline in influence negatively affects democratic quality by compromising accountability (Liddiard, 2018). As political parties articulate citizen interests and facilitate mobilization, they derive their legitimacy from these very functions. According to this view, party legitimacy is rooted in membership, as these organizations provide a vital structure for citizens to coalesce around shared ideas and amplify their collective voice (International IDEA, 2020).

More recently, scholarly attention has shifted toward how parties react to contemporary challenges (Gauja & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2021) focusing specifically on new engagement models developed to counterbalance the decline in traditional membership.

These new forms of linkage are not intended to replace traditional membership. Instead, they should be viewed as 'lighter' forms of engagement aimed at revitalizing traditional party structures by adapting to the demands of more politically active sectors of society. One such model

is multi-speed membership, which offers a lower level of commitment, such as becoming a recognized supporter, primarily to decrease barriers to entry (International IDEA, 2020; Scarrow, 2015). By offering these flexible levels of involvement, political parties may reassert their role as vital political mediators.

Additionally, digitalization, evolving communication patterns, and shifting expectations of political engagement have prompted parties to experiment with new organizational models. These include flexible and hybrid forms of participation, online activism, and issue-based mobilization that complement traditional membership structures. A particularly dynamic dimension of this transformation involves the deployment of social media and digital participation tools. Platforms such as Facebook, X, and Instagram, including dedicated party applications and online deliberation platforms, have emerged as new arenas for interaction between parties and citizens. Through these tools, parties can reach a wider, more diverse audience, foster reciprocal communication, and mobilize supporters around specific causes or campaigns in real time (Chadwick, 2017).

Digital platforms strengthen political interaction by bridging the gap between leaders and followers through intermediate bodies, while also enabling grassroots organizations to develop and exchange best practices. In this respect, digital platforms primarily foster socialization and participation by creating an interactive space for the exchange of ideas and opinions, rather than seeking to establish an alternative party structure.

Multi-speed membership can enhance the representativeness of political parties by linking them more effectively to their electorate. This is particularly significant as digital followers often constitute a distinct demographic group compared to traditional members. The central challenge remains converting these online supporters into active participants. Addressing this requires an integrated strategy that harmonizes digital engagement with traditional membership structures.

3.1.1. Diffusion

By adopting multi-speed membership, political parties can engage individuals through mailing lists as an initial step; in some cases, this process extends beyond sympathizer engagement to offer a pathway toward full membership.

For example, the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom and the *Partido Popular* (People's Party) in Spain provide the option of becoming either a member or a supporter. These roles differ in two primary ways: first, while membership typically requires a fee, becoming a supporter is free or significantly lower in cost. Second, members possess voting rights in decision-making mechanisms, whereas supporters generally do not.

In Portugal, the *Iniciativa Liberal* (Liberal Initiative) allows individuals to volunteer by suggesting policies or participating in events before officially joining the party (International IDEA, 2020). Similarly, several urban and green parties in Belgium have adopted soft participation models, including mailing lists, online thematic groups, micro-volunteering, and short-term

campaigns²². These hybrid mechanisms lower the threshold for engagement while maintaining responsiveness to specific policy issues.

The Italian Democratic Party (*Partito Democratico*) represents a distinctive case of 'light' party membership. Its leadership selection follows a dual-stage mechanism: initially, candidates undergo a screening process restricted to registered party members, who narrow the field to a shortlist of three. Subsequently, the final leader is selected through open primaries accessible to the general electorate (Seddone et al., 2021). The evaluation of this system remains mixed; while it has provided strong legitimacy for the leader and broad—though declining—participation, its latest application revealed significant tensions. In that instance, the elected leader placed second among registered members, creating a conflict between the party core and the broader sympathizer base. Although its statute includes provisions intended to leverage the involvement of sympathizers beyond leadership contests, the party has struggled to institutionalize their contributions on a continuous basis. Similarly, in Hungary, the 'United for Hungary' opposition coalition organized nationwide primaries to select joint candidates and a single prime ministerial nominee. This initiative opened internal decision-making to a broader electorate, fostering inclusiveness and opposition unity within a restrictive political environment. Another emerging model involves the digitalization of party membership to enhance online engagement. The growth of these virtual support networks has become a primary focus of interest for both party and communication scholars.

In Norway, political parties have successfully integrated social media outreach with traditional field organization. By utilizing Web 2.0 functionalities to coordinate volunteers, organize local events, and engage younger demographics, Norwegian parties have enhanced citizen participation at the grassroots level. (Bjørnå et al., 2022).

In Poland, both major and minor parties have introduced hybrid membership systems that integrate online voting, internal webinars, and digital training for activists. Notably, Polish law does not provide specific regulations that explicitly distinguish online membership from traditional physical membership. Consequently, the legal status, rights, and obligations of party members remain governed by each party's individual statute.

A notable example is the Agora Party in Brussels, which employs a model that enables more active members to exert greater influence over policy development (Junius & Matthieu, 2023). The Agora case demonstrates that while a deliberative model effectively prevents traditional elite capture, it creates a new tension between a highly engaged core and a largely inactive membership base. Consequently, the party must strike a careful balance: empowering active participants without alienating the broader membership. Failure to manage this friction results in a mutual frustration that necessitates constant and sustained organizational attention.

La République En Marche! (now Renaissance) in France serves as a prominent example of how political parties can cultivate a digital sphere for political activism. The party developed numerous online platforms and digital activism spaces designed to enable members to influence policy development and engage in grassroots mobilization (International IDEA, 2020). How-

²²<https://more.bham.ac.uk/populism-in-action/2021/03/30/how-belgiums-vlaams-belang-leads-the-way-in-digital-polit>

ever, evidence suggests that following the initial phase of mobilization, the party's organizational foundations eroded, ultimately restricting active party life to the leadership cadre (Fabre, 2024).

In Germany, political parties have increasingly experimented with digital participation tools. For example, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (the Green Party) utilizes online platforms for internal debates, policy consultations, and local coordination, allowing supporters to engage without formal membership. Similarly, the SPD's online initiative, 'SPD Plus,' offers digital forums and virtual training sessions to involve sympathizers in campaign activities. Under Germany's Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), political parties are formally tasked with participating in the formation of the 'political will of the people.' The 1967 Parties Law (*Parteiengesetz*) reinforced this requirement, specifying that intra-party democracy must be membership-based and mandating that parties establish local units in accessible locations to ensure meaningful participation. (Scarrow, 2019)

The example of the Green parties, which nearly doubled their membership between 2017 and 2024²³, illustrates how a party can successfully adapt its traditional political culture to contemporary challenges through the socialization process (Brunsbach et al., 2025). This growth provides crucial evidence for the claim that it is possible to maintain the core concept of a traditional party while simultaneously expanding its base.

3.1.2. Policy Recommendations

Findings from our Delphi study suggest a relative consensus that 'lighter' forms of engagement can help revitalize political parties, while simultaneously signaling several associated challenges. These new models should not be viewed as alternatives to traditional membership—which must maintain its distinctive and central role—but rather as supplementary engagement tools intended to encourage the participation of like-minded voters. Consequently, these participation models should not be framed as a permanent substitute for revitalizing and strengthening existing party structures. Any approach involving new membership categories must be carefully regulated to prevent unintended consequences and must establish clear boundaries for organizational prerogatives to ensure the priorities of current members remain protected. To prevent the erosion of the party's core, a balance must be maintained between committed traditional activists and broader membership groups. Thus, multi-speed membership requires a cautious and balanced approach to avoid undermining the trust of registered members. Furthermore, the digital sphere should be integrated within a comprehensive communication strategy for party culture, encompassing both social processes and local initiatives.

With these considerations in mind, we recommend the following approaches for adapting this model of membership:

I. Creating a Functional and Effective Virtual Space

Online platforms can encourage a significant proportion of supporters to engage with the party

²³<https://www.statista.com/statistics/957296/green-party-membership-development/?srsltid=AfmB0orbTPZ8w4ciI.1hUPUAI6vb7oBvbsAueXQeMz9hiHuHuLlp9SHs>

without committing to formal membership. For the organization, this layer of supporters functions as a network of sensors, essential for identifying emerging issues in a timely manner and mobilizing relevant information during the policy formulation process. In this respect, virtual spaces must extend beyond superficial interactions like 'likes,' allowing sympathizers to engage more substantively with the party. To sustain involvement, supporters must perceive the utility of their online participation through a consistent flow of feedback. Consequently, online platforms should be calibrated to facilitate a lower threshold of involvement without serving as a substitute for full membership.

II. Establishing a Clear Framework of Scope and Limits for Multi-Speed Membership

We recommend establishing a well-defined structure that outlines the scope and limitations of this membership model. Clearly defining membership boundaries prevents unrealistic expectations regarding influence over party policy and decision-making. In the context of digital membership specifically, while citizens are encouraged to participate actively, they must acknowledge that individual contributions within the digital sphere do not directly dictate party policy or strategy. This necessitates the creation of a mutual balance between the expectations of the members and those of the organization. To support this, parties must provide clear, longitudinal pathways for engagement, ranging from occasional volunteering to leadership roles. By defining the expectations for every level of commitment, parties can mitigate frustration and provide a transparent roadmap for those seeking deeper involvement.

III. Institutional Safeguards for Full Party Membership

It is fundamental to prioritize the commitment of registered members, particularly regarding decision-making processes and the selection of candidates and leadership. Fully registered members should be afforded exclusive participation opportunities that distinguish their status from other levels of commitment. The party must carefully balance the empowerment of active participants with the need to avoid alienating the broader membership; failure to manage this friction results in mutual frustration that necessitates constant, sustained organizational attention. In this respect, institutional responsiveness must be carefully calibrated to maintain organizational equilibrium.

IV. Transparency and effective communication

Parties should proactively inform members of decisions and policy processes through robust internal communication channels prior to any public disclosure. This communication should encompass the full organizational spectrum, ranging from specific individual policies to comprehensive programs and the party's broader strategic visions. Such transparency is essential for fostering institutional trust, increasing engagement, and strengthening the members' sense of belonging.

V. Digital Security Considerations

As digitalization expands, parties must remain cognizant of the potential risks and limitations inherent in digital engagement. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we recommend that parties establish robust mechanisms for participant verification that balance security requirements with

the principles of privacy and accessibility.

VI. Socialization and Effective Communication of Party Culture

As previously stated, the primary objective is to increase membership and revitalize political parties. Achieving this requires that effective communication, including digital strategies, be integrated with a social process driven by local party structures. Such an integration is essential for the party to bridge the gap between digital engagement and tangible, real-world impact. Furthermore, this process should be coupled with local initiatives specifically designed to socialize new members into the party culture.

VII. Funding More Research on Multi-speed Membership and Digital Activism

The expert panel did not reach a full consensus regarding the effectiveness of new and "lighter" forms of party membership; notably, a sizable minority expressed concern that these models might weaken the incentives for individuals to become full party members. Given this ambiguity, we recommend that the EU fund targeted research to determine whether, and under what conditions, digital and multi-speed membership can yield a net positive impact on the vitality of party organizations.

4. Making Parliaments More Representative and Trustworthy

4.1. Regulating Lobbying

Although the term 'lobbying' is somewhat problematic because its scope and extent have never been precisely defined, it primarily describes activities conducted by individuals and groups to influence elected representatives (Chari et al., 2019). In broader terms, lobbying reflects the capacity of actors to influence policy-making processes, providing them with the means to 'have a say' and intervene in legislative outcomes (Bitonti & Mariotti, 2023). Because of this role, it is considered an essential component of contemporary representative government (Holman & Luneburg, 2012).

However, lobbying activities can also undermine the perceived legitimacy of a governmental system. This occurs when such activities result in monetary enrichment or private benefits for public office holders, thereby prioritizing narrow interests over the broader public good. (Holman & Luneburg, 2012)

In this context, the fundamental rationale for regulating lobbying is to safeguard democratic processes and maintain public trust in government decision-making. Lobbying laws introduce formal regulations that practitioners must adhere to when attempting to influence government officials. Common measures include mandatory registers requiring lobbyists to enroll before contacting high-profile public officers (including parliamentarians), as well as imposing a duty on politicians to disclose meetings with representatives of special interests. The rationale for such measures lies in the belief that requiring lobbyists to register and disclose their activities enhances accountability, making it easier to identify and address potential conflicts of interest. Generally, regulating lobbying is considered necessary for its potential to increase the trans-

parency and accountability of parliaments. By shining a light on these practices, regulation aims to prevent corruption and mitigate the risk of undue influence by powerful interests. (Bitonti & Mariotti, 2023).

However, scholarly research has evolved, leading to a rationale that extends “beyond transparency” (Bitonti & Mariotti, 2023). In this context, recent scholarship emphasizes fair equality of access for stakeholders, ensuring that public policy is informed by a diverse range of societal interests rather than only those with the greatest financial means, as well as the public accountability of policymakers (Bitonti & Mariotti, 2023; Crepaz, 2020). Consequently, regulating lobbying addresses a wider sphere of relations and involves a broader set of principles and behaviors (Crepaz, 2020). This objective should be pursued by establishing an ethical, open, and equitable framework that legitimizes the role of lobbying. Legislators seeking to regulate lobbying within their own political systems are therefore tasked with disentangling a complex set of challenges. The fundamental perspective must facilitate transparent interaction between organized interests and policymakers, ensuring that the procedures introduced do not increase the 'cost' of entry to the point that participation becomes unfeasible for smaller organizations. This approach aligns with the primary purpose of lobbying: to incorporate the public voice into the decision-making process and reflect citizens' interests.

4.1.1. Diffusion

A growing number of countries are developing policies to promote political transparency, with the regulation of lobbying serving as a critical component. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline dataset, approximately thirty contemporary political systems have established specific rules governing the activities of lobbyists within parliament. While most of these are consolidated democracies, a majority of advanced pluralist systems still lack such regulations. Consequently, the debate regarding the necessity and implementation of formal legislation on this matter remains ongoing

A growing number of countries are developing policies to promote political transparency, with the regulation of lobbying serving as a critical component. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline dataset²⁴, approximately thirty contemporary political systems have established specific rules governing the activities of lobbyists within parliament. While most of these are consolidated democracies, a majority of advanced pluralist systems still lack such regulations. Consequently, the debate regarding the necessity and implementation of formal legislation on this matter remains ongoing. (Crepaz, 2020).

While the USA, Canada, and Germany were precursors of these policies, by the 2010s regulations had already been established in 'Lithuania (2001), Poland (2005), Hungary (2006, repealed in 2011), the European Commission (2008), Macedonia (2008), France (2010), Slovenia (2010), and Austria (2011)' (Holman & Luneburg, 2012, p. 76). A recent survey of jurisdictions with laws regulating the interaction between lobbyists and elected representatives found that their number doubled in approximately one decade (Chari et al., 2019). Within the EU, member

²⁴<https://data.ipu.org/>

states utilize either mandatory requirements or 'soft' regulations that introduce incentives for transparent lobbying (Bauer et al., 2021).

In detail, lobbying regulation displays a broad, albeit differentiated, spectrum of institutionalization. In Belgium, a mandatory register for interest representatives has been active in the Federal Parliament since 2018 and was progressively extended to regional assemblies²⁵: Specifically, Article 163(6) of the Rules of Procedure of the Belgian House of Representatives stipulates that companies, institutions, organizations, and natural persons registering in the lobby register must undertake to act in compliance with the Code of Conduct appended to the Standing Orders of the House.

France adopted the Loi Sapin II (2016)²⁶, which established a compulsory digital register managed by the *Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique* (HATVP), responsible for enforcing disclosure obligations and sanctions. Similarly Germany's, the *Lobbyregistergesetz*²⁷ entered into force in 2022 and was strengthened in 2024, expanding the scope of reportable contacts and introducing fines for non-compliance. Within the European context, France and Germany represent the most comprehensive systems, combining mandatory registration and disclosure with enforceable penalties.

In contrast, Poland introduced the Act on Lobbying Activities in the Legislative Process in 2006—the first statutory regulation of its kind in Central and Eastern Europe. While it requires professional lobbyists to register and disclose their activities, implementation has been limited; the register remains underutilized, with a small number of registered entities and minimal enforcement. Transparency is hindered by incomplete reporting and weak sanctions (Bauer et al., 2016). As for the United Kingdom, the state maintains a narrower regime under the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act (2014), which applies only to consultant lobbyists and relies heavily on self-regulation for other actors²⁸. Senedd (Welsh Parliament) employs a dedicated Citizen Engagement Team that utilizes "stakeholder mapping" to proactively engage communities—essentially "headhunting" for diverse voices rather than waiting for formal petitions. This model inspired our proposal to create a non-partisan office tasked with identifying and recruiting potential stakeholders who lack the organizational capacity to engage in traditional lobbying.

The regulatory 'space' across Europe is expanding, reflecting a shared trend toward making lobbying activities traceable and ethically codified within parliamentary systems. For instance, the EU Transparency Register serves as a comprehensive public database where lobbyists and interest groups are required to disclose their specific interests. This register includes a Code of Conduct supported by a formal complaints mechanism. Furthermore, the U.S. Lobbying Disclosure Act and Canada's Lobbying Act serve as established benchmarks; while the former requires lobbyists to report activities and expenditures quarterly to ensure financial transparency, the latter maintains a comprehensive public registry and mandates ethics training to bolster institutional accountability.

²⁵<https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BE/BE-LC01/working-methods/openness-and-transparency/>

²⁶<https://www.hatvp.fr/english-news/comparative-study-of-lobbying-regulation-mechanisms/?utm>

²⁷<https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/startseite>

²⁸see in this regard: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/4?utm>

4.1.2. Policy Recommendations

Our Delphi study revealed a strong consensus that regulating lobbying enhances transparency, which in turn strengthens parliamentary trustworthiness and ensures greater representativeness by allowing a diverse range of stakeholders to influence policy-making. Furthermore, lobbying regulations must evolve to reflect the complexity of contemporary political systems, ensuring both increased transparency and a more effective legislative process. In this respect, we recommend a comprehensive approach that includes the following actions:

I. Robust and Feasible Regulatory Framework

The primary recommendation involves the implementation of mandatory registers, requiring all lobbyists and organizations to enroll prior to commencing their activities. These registers should mandate comprehensive and timely disclosures, encompassing lobbyist identities, the nature of their activities, the interests of beneficiaries, financial expenditures, and all relevant documentation. Establishing clear rules and disclosure requirements can mitigate the asymmetric influence of specific interest groups. To ensure efficacy, these regulations must be unambiguous to prevent loopholes and selective compliance. Simultaneously, the regulatory framework should be designed so as not to discourage less institutionalized groups from seeking structured interactions with policymakers. To this end, parliaments should consider establishing a dedicated support service to assist stakeholders in complying with these regulations.

II. Proactive Outreach to Under-Represented Interests

To achieve fair equality of access, regulation must not be passive. Parliaments should institutionalize "stakeholder mapping" to identify groups that lack the resources to lobby and proactively invite them to provide testimony. Proactive institutional outreach serves as a "repair mechanism" for the representative chain. By establishing a non-partisan office to identify and solicit these voices, the parliament reduces the information asymmetry that typically favors well-resourced lobbyists. This approach mitigates the risk of a "professionalization barrier," which may be unintentionally created by otherwise robust regulatory frameworks.

III. Clear Codes of Conduct and Ethical Standards

Both lobbyists and legislators should adhere to a formal code of conduct governing their professional standards and interactions with third parties. This code must be grounded in ethical integrity and core principles, specifically transparency, accountability, responsiveness, impartiality, and fairness. In accordance with the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, these standards must ensure that all actions taken by public officials are dedicated exclusively to serving the public interest with strict impartiality (OECD, 2021).

IV. Extended Oversight and Effective Sanctions

To achieve effective transparency, oversight must extend to all lobbying activities and their resulting outcomes, rather than being limited to the mere registration of organizations and public lists. This oversight framework must include proportionate penalties to ensure that both public officials and lobbyists are held accountable for any violations²⁹.

²⁹See in this regard: <https://lobbyingtransparency.net/standards/>

V. Context-Based Policy Framework

Lobbying regulations must align with the local context, taking into account specific socio-economic conditions and public expectations. To enhance procedural effectiveness, the lobbying framework must undergo a comprehensive review to ensure alignment with broader regulations, including relevant statutory laws and administrative policies. Furthermore, it is essential to conduct an initial impact assessment followed by periodic reviews to ensure long-term consistency and adaptability.

4.2. Strengthening Parliamentary Transparency and Communication

As elected bodies that represent diverse sectors of society, parliaments have a fundamental responsibility to reconcile the conflicting interests and expectations of different groups through the democratic means of dialogue and compromise. In this sense, they are expected to be representative both through the composition of the legislature—which results from the electoral process—and through fair and inclusive parliamentary procedures that provide all members with the opportunity to express their views (Beetham, 2006). This inevitably necessitates a parliament that is transparent in the exercise of its functions and maintains robust communication channels with the public.

Public engagement initiatives in parliamentary activities have gained significant scholarly attention in recent years. According to Leston-Bandeira and Siefken (2023), various forms of engagement, ranging from informing the public to deeper involvement, are strongly interconnected, with all such activities being facilitated by communication. These initiatives foster interaction between citizens and the legislature, empowering the public and enhancing representation. Increased parliamentary transparency and communication aim to bridge the perceived gap between citizens and parliaments. Ultimately, parliamentary transparency hinges on public understanding and engagement, which requires the provision of timely and accessible information regarding both legislative and non-legislative activities.

In the field of legislation, transparency is considered essential for modern legislatures within parliamentary democracies (Voermans et al., 2015). Drawing on Beetham's (1998) perspective that the fundamental principle of democracy is the people's right to exercise a controlling influence over public decisions and decision-makers, strengthening parliamentary transparency is vital, as it constitutes a necessary condition for the democratic process. Transparent and inclusive legislative processes thus function as a critical democratic check on government action (Voermans et al., 2015).

Communication is a vital component for facilitating dialogue with citizens and establishing participatory channels between the public and the institution (IPU-UNDP, 2022). Indeed, informing citizens about parliamentary activities—thereby engaging their interest—is recognized as a core institutional responsibility (Beetham, 2006). Effective parliamentary communication requires a strategic plan to inform the public, encompassing up-to-date websites, live broadcasts of proceedings (particularly plenary sessions), accessible archives, and active social media engagement.

4.2.1. Diffusion

The advent of the Internet has enhanced the potential for parliaments to become more transparent and accountable, marking a critical step toward fostering greater public engagement (Coleman & Blumler, 2009). Griffith and Leston-Bandeira (2012) highlight that 'new media' offers novel avenues for accessing information, communicating, and utilizing services through ICT-based systems and digital platforms, with the primary objective of bolstering public participation. This category encompasses email, websites, automated alerting services, and webcasting. Notably, while websites often serve as primary one-way communication tools, they contribute to legitimizing the political system by providing educational resources and information about the legislative landscape. Email, by contrast, facilitates a degree of direct interaction between citizens and parliaments, signaling an intent for two-way engagement. Similarly, video and radio, though essentially non-interactive technologies, offer vital supplementary channels for citizens to access information regarding parliamentary proceedings.

The importance of parliamentary transparency has increased over the past decade, driven by the organization of committee meetings, the broadcasting of sessions, and the provision of accessible data for all sectors of society (Deveaux et al., 2021). In this context, many parliaments have been engaged in Open Government Partnership (OGP)³⁰, composed of government leaders and civil society advocates, as well as Open Parliament e-Network (OPeN)³¹, a consortium that supports parliaments for collaborating with civil society to enhance transparency.

Parliaments within Europe and beyond have been urged to strengthen their transparency and communication frameworks to foster greater public engagement. A primary example is the EU Transparency Register, a joint database of the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union. By listing interest representatives and their activities, alongside detailed resource allocations, the register demonstrates to citizens which interests are being represented at the institutional level.

EU national parliaments have worked to enhance their transparency and communication channels, particularly in the post-pandemic era. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK Parliament maintained transparency by relying on its independent statutory bodies. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) played a key role by generating independent fiscal analyses, while the National Audit Office (NAO) produced COVID-related reports to facilitate parliamentary scrutiny. Furthermore, transparency was preserved through the implementation of a virtual 'hybrid parliament' model. (Lozano et al., 2023)

Another example is France, where the National Assembly hosted a virtual public forum on the Decidim platform³² platform to gather citizen input on post-COVID-19 policy priorities. Similarly, the Parliament of Finland initiated 'Ask the Speaker' Facebook Live sessions in May 2018 to enhance public engagement and transparency, allowing citizens to directly question the Speaker about parliamentary activities (Leston-Bandeira & Siefken, 2023).

³⁰<https://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/>

³¹<https://openparliamentnetwork.org/>

³²<https://decidim.org/>

Furthermore, dedicated television networks, such as Oireachtas TV, represent a best practice for parliamentary communication by providing public access to the proceedings of both houses of the Irish Parliament.

Ghana serves as a notable example of institutional efforts to bridge the accessibility gap. The country has addressed this through various mechanisms, including live television and radio broadcasts of plenary sessions and committee meetings, as well as the strategic use of newspapers to reach rural areas with limited digital access. (IPU, 2022)

Similarly, Estonia and Slovenia represent leading examples of how parliaments can encourage physical public participation, particularly through their regular hosting of open parliamentary events (International IDEA, 2025).

4.2.2. Policy Recommendations

According to our Delphi study, increased parliamentary transparency and communication are expected primarily to improve the trustworthiness and representativeness of parliaments. We consider transparency and communication to be two mutually reinforcing components of public engagement. To ensure a framework in which transparent parliaments effectively communicate with the public, we propose the following perspectives:

I. Integrated Approach to Transparency

To achieve institutional transparency, we recommend that all parliamentary activities be subject to public disclosure. Beyond the institution of mandatory lobbying registers (see Section 4.1), legislative assemblies must ensure the timely release of parliamentary data; this should include reports on the activities of legislative committees and a comprehensible illustration of parliamentary budgets. Ultimately, this mandate for transparency should extend to all related documentation.

II. Strengthening Citizen Participation and Closing the Feedback Loop

We recommend that citizens be actively encouraged to engage with parliamentary processes through structured participation activities. This engagement must be characterized by transparency, providing citizens with clear information regarding the objectives, scope, and expected outcomes of their involvement (International IDEA, 2025). Furthermore, transparency should guide both the design and implementation of these activities to ensure they genuinely incorporate public perspectives. Citizen insights should be integrated into the legislative process through robust feedback mechanisms. Two-way communication is only effective if it is consequential; if citizens' inputs are ignored without explanation, it risks reinforcing the existing disconnection. We recommend the inclusion of a formal requirement for the relevant parliamentary committee to provide a written response to all structured inputs received. This directly addresses the "responsiveness" dimension of the democratic spiral.

III. Creating Physical Environments for Engagement

Citizens can connect more deeply with the legislative process when they experience the atmosphere of the parliamentary floor. Consequently, parliaments should facilitate this connection

by organizing public tours of their facilities. Such access allows citizens to feel more engaged in parliamentary activities by providing a firsthand perspective on the environment in which their representatives operate.

IV. Enforcing Transparency Rules

To ensure effective transparency, it is essential that rules are strictly observed and that violations are met with appropriate sanctions. Consequently, proportionate penalties should be implemented for instances where members of parliament (MPs), parliamentary groups, or administrations fail to disclose the expenditure of public funds.

V. Using Clear Language and Mitigating Information Asymmetry

We recommend that parliamentary communication bodies adopt a citizen-centric approach to their activities, recognizing that overly technical parliamentary jargon can create unintended barriers between representatives and the public. Relying on specialized language rather than clear and accessible communication is ineffective, as it obstructs, rather than promotes, genuine transparency.

VI. Establishing Two-Way Communication Channels

Communication activities, on the other hand, enable citizens to engage with issues of personal interest, thus reinforcing their sense of belonging in political life. Priority should be given to establishing interactive communication channels that facilitate meaningful citizen feedback. Consequently, one-way communication in which parliamentary channels disseminate information without genuine citizen engagement is ineffective. To this end, best practices include engaging the wider public, such as younger cohorts, and establishing dedicated programs for underrepresented groups.

VII. Engagement on Social Media

Social media offers citizens—particularly the youth demographic—immediate access to legislative bodies, thereby enhancing the relationship between the public and parliament (Leston-Bandeira & Bender, 2013). By fostering greater digital engagement, these platforms enable citizens to stay informed about political developments in real-time, participate in deliberation, and ultimately influence the policy-making process.

Conclusion

This deliverable is dedicated to proposing concrete, evidence-based policy recommendations grounded in the preceding Delphi study, which evaluated the effectiveness of various actions adopted over the last two decades to reconnect citizens with the democratic process.

We believe that repairing the democratic disconnect requires an integrated approach that balances citizen expectations with the institutional capacity to act on their behalf. While none of the actions included in our catalogue constitutes a 'silver bullet' for revitalizing the traditional pillars of representative democracy, in the first deliverable (D6.1) of this work package, we

identified three broad strategies that can work in synergy: increasing citizen engagement, revitalizing political parties, and making parliaments more representative and transparent.

Our Delphi study (see D6.2) sought to determine whether experts, both scholars and practitioners could reach a consensus on the effectiveness of specific actions within each strategy, focusing our energy on the most promising ideas. This report serves as a practical roadmap for translating those findings into implementation.

The results of our Delphi study indicate shared perspectives on actions to empower citizens and streamline the work of parliamentary assemblies. Conversely, the failure to reach a consensus on revitalizing political parties is noteworthy. While 'multispeed membership' was identified as the most efficient action, the lack of agreement likely stems from a lack of consolidated ideas regarding the future of political parties. Therefore, the insights gathered regarding political parties must be verified and discussed collectively. This deliverable, along with the preceding one, brings home significant outcomes, demonstrating that a collective perspective is essential for developing an effective strategy to revitalize parties as a unique intermediary mechanism.

Repairing the democratic disconnect requires a multifaceted approach that integrates robust citizen engagement with parliaments that authentically reflect the voices of the people. Central to this effort is the role of political parties as primary intermediaries. Consequently, this study drives us to implement consensus-based actions and foster stakeholder collaboration while encouraging deeper collective dialogue regarding the future of political parties. Only through this synergy and holistic approach can the democratic process meet the challenges of the 21st century while preserving its fundamental principles.

Acknowledgements

These policy recommendations are based on the activities conducted within Work Package 6 (WP6) of the REDIRECT project. They have greatly benefited from the active contributions of numerous experts involved in the Delphi survey, the results of which are detailed in Deliverable D6.2.

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the following experts (listed in alphabetical order) for their invaluable suggestions: Antonio Floridia, Gabriella Ilonszki, Evelyne Jadot, Nino Junius, Stefani Langehennig, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Thomas Poguntke, Andrea Pritoni, Tapio Raunio, and Michele Vannucchi. Additionally, we thank all project partners involved in WP6 for sharing their expertise.

Finally, please note that this document reflects the views of the authors only; the experts mentioned above cannot be held responsible for its content

References

Ancheta-Arrabal, A., & Preckler Galguera, M. (2025). Education for Global Citizenship Towards the New European Education Area. *Social Sciences*, 14(2), 73. <https://doi.org/10.3390/>

- Bauer, E., Pielucha, P., & Thiel, M. (2016). *Lobbying Regulation Framework in Poland*. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595848/EPRS_BRI%282016%29595848_EN.pdf?utm
- Bauer, E., Thiel, M., Chiocchetti, I., Kotyla, S., & Sante, C. (2021). *Transparency of lobbying in Member States and the UK* ((PE 690.588; Transparency Unit, DG Presidency).). EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service.
- Beetham, D. (1998). Democracy: Key Principles, Institutions and Problems. In *Democracy: Its principles and achievement*. Inter-Parliamentary Union.
- Beetham, D. (2006). *Parliament and democracy in the twenty-first century: A guide to good practice*. Inter-Parliamentary Union.
- Bitonti, A., & Mariotti, C. (2023). Beyond transparency: The principles of lobbying regulation and the perspective of professional lobbying consultancies. *Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica*, 53(2), 143–160. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2022.16>
- Bjørnå, H., Steinveg, B., & Hernes, H.-K. (2022). Local politicians in the age of new media. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 4. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.917716>
- Blais, A. (2007). Turnout in elections. In *The Oxford handbook of political behavior* (pp. 621–635). Oxford University Press.
- Brunsbach, S., John, S., & Bukow, S. U. (2025). Consequences of membership growth – the case of the German Green Party. *Party Politics*, 31(2), 228–238. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688241306725>
- Budge, I. (2020). Party-based representation: The paradox of democracy. In *Research Handbook on Political Representation*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Chadwick, A. (2017). *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190696726.001.0001>
- Chari, R., Hogan, J., Murphy, G., & Crepaz, M. (2019). *Regulating lobbying: A global comparison* (Vol. 2). Manchester University Press.
- Coleman, S., & Blumler, J. G. (2009). *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CB09780511818271>
- Crepaz, M. (2020). To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: What use do lobbyists make of lobby registers? *European Political Science Review*, 12(3), 347–369. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000156>
- Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (A c. Di). (2002). *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies* (1st publ. in paperback). Oxford University Press.
- Deveaux, K., Svecova, N., & Baker, T. (Government consultant). (2021). *Parliaments responding to a pandemic: Lessons learned for emergency planning : report from the House Democracy Partnership*

and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation [Language material, Electronic resource, Computer, Online resource]. [object Object]. http://catalog.gpo.gov/F/?func=direct&doc_number=001208072&format=999

Dewey, J. (2010). EXCERPT FROM THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS. In *The Idea of the Public Sphere*. Lexington Books.

Deželan, T. (2023). *Young people's participation in European democratic processes—How to improve and facilitate youth involvement*.

Donbavand, S., & Hoskins, B. (2021). Citizenship Education for Political Engagement: A Systematic Review of Controlled Trials. *Social Sciences*, 10(5), 151. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10050151>

Edwards, A., de Kool, D., & van Ooijen, C. (2015). The information ecology of parliamentary monitoring websites: Pathways towards strengthening democracy. *Information Polity*. <https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-150372>

European Commission. (2017). *Citizenship education at school in Europe—2017*. Publications Office of the European Union. <https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/publications/eurydice-brief-citizenship-education-school-europe-2017>

Galston, W. A. (2001). Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(Volume 4, 2001), 217–234. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.217>

Gauja, A., & Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2021). Decline, adaptation and relevance: Political parties and their researchers in the twentieth century. *European Political Science*, 20(1), 123–138. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00312-8>

Griffith, J., & Leston-Bandeira, C. (2012). How Are Parliaments Using New Media to Engage with Citizens? *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 18.

Holman, C., & Luneburg, W. (2012). Lobbying and transparency: A comparative analysis of regulatory reform. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 1(1), 75–104. <https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.4>

Hoskins, B., Janmaat, J. G., & Melis, G. (2017). Tackling inequalities in political socialisation: A systematic analysis of access to and mitigation effects of learning citizenship at school. *Social Science Research*, 68, 88–101. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.09.001>

Huebner, C., & Eichhorn, J. (2022). The Tide Raising all Boats? Social Class Differences in Political Participation among Young People in Scotland. *Scottish Affairs*, 31(2), 165–189. <https://doi.org/10.3366/scot.2022.0407>

International IDEA. (2020). *New Forms of Political Party Membership: Political Party Innovation Primer 5*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2020.25>

- International IDEA. (2025). *Principles of Parliamentary Public Engagement: Guides on Citizen Engagement for Parliaments*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2025.35>
- IPU. (2022). *Impact Report 2022*. Inter-Parliamentary Union.
- IPU-UNDP. (2022). *Global Parliamentary Report*.
- Jerome, L. (2012). Service learning and active citizenship education in England. *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice*, 7(1), 59–70. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197911432594>
- Karlhofer, V. (2007). Voting at 16: Expectations and Perspectives. *Forum Politische Bildung: Informationen Zur Politischen Bildung*, 27, 37–42.
- Kritzinger, S., Zeglovits, E., & Oberlugauer, P. (2013). *Projekttitel: Wählen mit 16 bei der Nationalratswahl 2013*. https://impact-sowi.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_societal_impact/2018_Phase_2/Stawi/Wahlstudie_Waehlen_mit_16.pdf
- Leston-Bandeira, C. (2012). Studying the Relationship between Parliament and Citizens. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 18(3–4), 265–274. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2012.706044>
- Leston-Bandeira, C., & Bender, D. (2013). How deeply are parliaments engaging on social media? *Information Polity*. <https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-130316>
- Leston-Bandeira, C., & Siefken, S. T. (2023). The development of public engagement as a core institutional role for parliaments. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 29(3), 361–379. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2214390>
- Liddiard, P. (2018). *Are Political Parties in Trouble?* Wilson Center. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/are-political-parties-trouble>
- Lozano, M., Atkinson, M., & Mou, H. (2023). Democratic Accountability in Times of Crisis: Executive Power, Fiscal Policy and COVID-19. *Government and Opposition*, 58(1), 39–60. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.24>
- Mair, P. (2013). *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*. Verso.
- Mandelbaum, A. G., & Swislow, D. R. (2016). The Role of Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations. In *Benchmarking and Self-Assessment for Parliaments*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0327-7>
- Manning, N., & Edwards, K. (2013). Does civic education for young people increase political participation? A systematic review. *Educational Review*, 66(1), 22–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131911.2013.763767>
- Martin, P. S., & Claibourn, M. P. (2013). Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 38(1), 59–81. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12003>
- Meyvaert, K. (2024). A Lower Voting Age in the Low Countries?: Potential Effects of Voting

Age at 16 for the Low Countries. *Politics of the Low Countries*, 6(2), 173–191. <https://doi.org/10.5553/PLC/.000069>

Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge University Press.

OECD. (2021). *Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access*. <https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en>.

Peters, Y., & Ensink, S. J. (2015). Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation. *West European Politics*, 38(3), 577–600. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.973260>

Poguntke, T., Scarrow, S. E., & Webb, P. D. (2024). Analysing Political Parties and Democracy: Themes, Questions, Problems. In T. Poguntke & W. Hofmeister (A c. Di), *Political Parties and the Crisis of Democracy: Organization, Resilience, and Reform* (p. 0). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198888734.003.0002>

Poguntke, T., Scarrow, S. E., Webb, P. D., Allern, E. H., Aylott, N., Van Biezen, I., Calossi, E., Lobo, M. C., Cross, W. P., Deschouwer, K., Enyedi, Z., Fabre, E., Farrell, D. M., Gauja, A., Pizzimenti, E., Kopecký, P., Koole, R., Müller, W. C., Kosiara-Pedersen, K., ... Verge, T. (2016). Party rules, party resources and the politics of parliamentary democracies: How parties organize in the 21st century. *Party Politics*, 22(6), 661–678. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816662493>

Scarrow, S. E. (2015). *Beyond Party Members: Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization*. Oxford University Press.

Scarrow, S. E. (2019). Multi-Speed Parties and Representation: The Evolution of Party Affiliation in Germany. *German Politics*, 28(2), 162–182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1496239>

Schwarzer, S., Zandonella, M., Zeglovits, E., Perlot, F., & Kozeluh, U. (2009). Wählen mit 16“ Eine Post Election Study zur Nationalratswahl 2008 Befragung – Fokusgruppen – Tiefeninterviews. Institut für Strategieanalysen. <https://images.derstandard.at/2009/05/15/studie.pdf>

Seddone, A., Venturino, F., & Sandri, G. (2021). Juntos pero no revueltos. Miembros, simpatizantes, y el Partido Democrático en Italia. *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 79(4), e194. <https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2021.79.4.M21.06>

Soroka, S. N., & Wlezien, C. (2010). *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion and Policy*. Cambridge University Press.

UNESCO. (2016). *Education 2030: Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all*. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000245656>

UNU-WIDER. (2014). *UNU-WIDER: Research Brief: The Impact of Civic Education Programmes on Political Participation*. <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/impact-civic-education-programmes-political-participation>

- Voermans, W., ten Napel, H.-M., & Passchier, R. (2015). Combining efficiency and transparency in legislative processes. *The Theory and Practice of Legislation*, 3(3), 279–294. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2015.1133398>
- Wattenberg, M. P. (2020). *Is Voting for Young People?* (5^a ed.). Routledge.
- Wolkenstein, F. (2019). *Rethinking Party Reform*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849940.002.0003>
- Worthy, B., & Langehennig, S. (2022). Accountability, analysis and avoidance: How PMO data impacts on Westminster. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2022.2117766>
- Zeglovits, E., & Aichholzer, J. (2014). Are People More Inclined to Vote at 16 than at 18? Evidence for the First-Time Voting Boost Among 16- to 25-Year-Olds in Austria. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(3), 351–361. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2013.872652>
- Zeglovits, E., & Zandonella, M. (2013). Political interest of adolescents before and after lowering the voting age: The case of Austria. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 16(8), 1084–1104. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.793785>